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Abstract: This paper examines the recent Irish High Court case of Zappone and Gilligan 
v. Revenue Commissioners and others, a challenge to the constitutionality of the state’s 
interpretation of the Irish Tax Code vis-à-vis the foreign marriage of a same-sex couple 
and their right to marry each other under Irish law. The right to marry and the nature of 
marriage are undefined in the Irish Constitution. Thus, a progressive interpretation may 
take into account contemporary knowledge of sexuality and sexual orientation and norms 
of equality and non-discrimination. This paper also discusses the ‘living document’ 
approach to constitutional interpretation and argues that the High Court misapplied the 
methodology of Supreme Court Justice Murray in Sinnott v. Minister for Education, 
which may offer the means to interpreting the Irish Constitution as protecting the right to 
marry another person of the same sex. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The case of Zappone and Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners and others
1
 was the first 
detailed judicial discussion in Ireland on an individual’s right, if any, to marry another 
person of the same sex under the Irish Constitution and laws together with one’s right to 
private and family life and to marry under the European Convention on Human Rights. In 
analysing the High Court judgment, I will focus solely on the constitutional questions that 
it poses as the appellate proceedings currently pending before the Supreme Court will rest 
on the constitutional questions on the right to marry and not compatibility with the 
Convention. I will examine the judicial interpretive approach underpinning the High 
Court judgment, namely, the ‘living document’ approach, and argue that the approach 
adopted by the High Court did not comport with that by the Supreme Court Justice 
Murray in Sinnott v. Minister for Education
2
 upon which the High Court approach was 
                                                 
*This is an earlier version of an article published in the Special Double Issue on ‘Protection of Sexual 
Minorities since Stonewall: Progress and Stalemate in Developed and Developing Countries’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights (Vol.13 Nos.2/3 March 2009). The contributions to the Special 
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Sexual Minorities since Stonewall: Progress and Stalemate in Developed and Developing Countries 
(Routledge 2010). The author is sincerely grateful to Phil Chan for his invaluable and constructive 
comments on this paper. 
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supposedly based. Indeed, I argue that the Sinnott approach offers hopes for an 
interpretation alternative to the High Court’s finding that recognises a constitutional right 
to marry another person of the same sex. 
 
Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland) 1937 
The drafting of the Irish Constitution preceded the process of international human rights 
standard-setting within the United Nations and regional organisations and is much 
reflected by the language and substantive content of its fundamental rights provisions 
(Articles 40-44). As Whyte argues,
3
 the language of the Constitution demonstrates the 
fusion of Christian and liberal democratic ideology, with the former influenced ‘to some 
extent’ by the Catholic teachings and doctrines of the time.4 While this fusion, or perhaps 
tension, subsumes the entire text of the Constitution, it is particularly glaring in the 
fundamental rights provisions. For example, it has been argued that Article 40, which 
guarantees the personal rights of the citizen including equality and the right to life, 
derives from ‘secular and rationalist theory’.5 In contrast, Article 41, which protects the 
rights of the family, and Article 42, which guarantees the right to education, are both 
considered to have been influenced by papal encyclicals and contemporary Catholic 
social teachings.
6
 The family, which the Constitution defines as ‘a natural and 
fundamental unit group’ and whose rights are ‘inalienable’, ‘imprescriptible’ and 
‘antecedent and superior to all positive law’,7 is a ‘moral institution’ founded upon 
‘marriage’.8 
Chubb has applied Martin’s theory of secularisation to early twentieth-century 
state-building in Ireland on the basis of a religious and nationalist identity,
9
 where Martin 
argues that an ‘indissoluble union’ of Church and State occurs in circumstances where 
the Church constitutes the sole agent of nationalism against political and cultural 
domination by a foreign power.
10
 Thus, nations with such a union remain ‘areas of high 
practice and belief’.11 Keogh explains that in the decade following the Irish war of 
independence and a bitter civil war in Ireland, there was ‘a pressing need for common 
ground where citizens could gather irrespective of political affiliation, which found 
expression in the search for marks of national identity, which were identifiably different 
from those that have long characterised the British national ethos’.12 In particular, 
                                                 
3 G. Whyte, ‘Some Reflections on the Role of Religion in the Constitutional Order’, in P. Tuomey and T. 
Murphy, eds., Ireland’s Evolving Constitution 1939–1997 (Dublin: Hart, 1998), 51, 60-61. 
4 J.M. Kelly, Fundamental Rights in Irish Law (Dublin: Allen Figgis, 1967), 57-58. See also M. Gallagher, ‘The 
Constitution and the Judiciary’, in J. Coakley and M. Gallagher, Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 4th ed. (Dublin: 
Routledge, 2005), 72. 
5 D. Costello, ‘The Natural Law and the Irish Constitution’, Studies, Vol.45 (1956), 403, 414. 
6 J.H. Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923–1970 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillian, 1980), 51-52. See also 
W.R. Duncan, ‘Supporting the Institution of Marriage in Ireland’, Irish Jurist, Vol.13 (1978), 215, 221. 
7 Article 41(1)(1) states that ‘[t]he State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit 
group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and 
superior to all positive law.’ See The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Úchtála [1966] IR 567. 
8 Article 41(3)(1) states that ‘[t]he State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on 
which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.’ 
9 B. Chubb, The Politics of the Irish Constitution (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1991), 40. 
10 D.A. Martin, A General Theory of Secularisation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 107. 
11 Ibid. 
12 R. Fanning, ‘Mr de Valera drafts a Constitution’, in B. Farrell, ed., De Valera’s Constitution and Ours (Dublin: 
Gill and Macmillian, 1988), 33, 42. 
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religion and language became ‘the two most obvious hallmarks of independent Ireland’.13 
More recently, however, Hogan criticises previous literature on the drafting of the 
Constitution for over-emphasising the influences of the Church and failing to 
acknowledge the extent of improvements upon the 1922 Saorstát Éireann (Free State) 
Constitution and the role of drafters other than incumbent Taoiseach (Prime Minister) 
Eamon de Valera, and argues that as a result of the Northern Ireland conflict, many 
commentators focused on aspects of the Irish Constitution considered to be confessional 
or to be offensive to the minority religious or political traditions.
14
 Instead, the more 
remarkable facet of the Constitution, Hogan discerns, is the extent of its secular or liberal 
democratic values, its respect for individual rights, its separation of Church and State, and 
the extent to which it does not reflect the Catholic teachings of the 1930s.
15
 Based on a 
comparative analysis, he contends that the Constitution in many respects is not dissimilar 
to other constitutions of its age. The original text of Article 44, respecting freedom of 
religion yet explicitly recognising the special position of the Roman Catholic Church, is 
often cited as a prime example of the Irish Constitution’s overt Catholic influences and its 
uniqueness.
16
 However, from ‘a necessarily incomplete’ survey of written or ‘unwritten’ 
constitutions from other European states in the pre- and post-World War II periods,
17
 
Hogan concludes that a ‘broad pattern’ emerged: predominantly Protestant or Lutheran 
states would provide for an established Church; predominantly Catholic states the 
‘special position’ status of the Roman Catholic Church; and predominantly Orthodox 
states either an established or a specially positioned Church.
18
 Thus, judging by the 
contemporary European standards of 1937, Hogan argues that the ‘special position’ of the 
Roman Catholic Church in the original text of Article 44 was not of an exceptional 
character.
19
 
Another provision often cited as embodying and representing the influences of 
Catholic social teaching is the express constitutional protection for the institution of 
marriage in Articles 41 and 42. However, this was not an idea original to the drafters. 
Hogan refers to Article 119 of the 1919 Constitution of the Weimar Republic, which 
expressly conferred special constitutional protection on the institution of marriage.
20
 In 
fact, the Irish and the Weimar Constitutions had other similarities,
21
 demonstrating the 
influence of comparative constitutional traditions already prevalent at the time. Hogan 
argues that Articles 41 and 42 most probably ‘reflect a diverse jumble of sources, ranging 
from papal encyclicals to the Weimar provisions to Article 16 of the [Anglo-Irish Treaty 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 G. Hogan, ‘De Valera, the Constitution and the Historians’, Irish Jurist, Vol.40 (2005), 293. 
15 Ibid, 294. 
16 D. Keogh, ‘The Irish Constitutional Revolution: An Analysis of the Making of the Irish Constitution’, in F. 
Litton, The Constitution of Ireland: 1937–1987 (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1988), 4, 39. 
17 Hogan, note 14 above, 301 (referring to the Act of Settlement 1701 (England), the 1814 Constitution of 
Norway, the 1921 Constitution of Poland, the 1948 Constitution of the Italian Republic, the 1978 Constitution 
of the Republic of Spain, and the 2001 Constitution of the Hellenic Republic of Greece). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 302. 
20 Ibid., 303. Article 119 of the 1919 Constitution of the Weimar Republic, quoted ibid., stated that ‘marriage, 
as the foundation of the family and the preservation and expansion of the nation, enjoys the special protection 
of the constitution’. 
21 Hogan, ibid. 
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of 1921]’.22 Expectation for a wholly secular document would be unrealistic given 
Ireland’s pre-Constitution history and the Constitution’s language and content reflect a 
wider range of sources than has previously been considered.
23
 
 
Interpretation of Bunreacht na hÉireann 
How important is the source of inspiration for Articles 41 and 42? Hogan argues that 
even if the provisions were exclusively inspired by Catholic social teaching, ‘the case law 
has long since broken loose of that particular inspirational source’.24 This independence 
began with McGee v. A.G.,
25
 where the Supreme Court ruled that a right to marital 
privacy protected a spouse from state interference against the use of contraceptives within 
marriage through enforcement of the criminal law. However, the inspiration did also 
enable the natural law approach to constitutional interpretation to have particular 
vibrancy in early jurisprudence, most notably through application of the doctrine of 
unenumerated rights developed in Ryan v. A.G.
26
 There the High Court held that Article 
40(3)(2), which respected ‘in particular’ the right to life, person, good name and 
property,’ was a ‘detailed statement’ of the rights protected under the general guarantee 
of Article 40(3)(1) which ‘must extend to rights not specified in Article 40’ as derived 
from ‘the Christian and democratic nature of the State’.27 Thus, it fell upon individual 
judges to determine the existence of such unenumerated rights, which the courts have 
since undertaken as part of the common law tradition.
28
 
As one of the factors for its continuing prevalence, the ‘willingness’ of some 
judges to invoke a natural legal order enabling the natural law approach to have a 
‘stubborn vibrancy’ has been cited.29 However, Hogan and Whyte argue that there has 
also been growing ‘judicial unease’ with determining the theoretical source for the rights 
protections.
30
 For example, in T.F. v. Ireland,
31
 the High Court refused to admit the 
expert testimony of theologians on natural legal theory regarding marriage or the 
essential features of Christian marriage,
32
 holding that while the constitutional order may 
recognise a natural legal order, the determining factor for the judge was the express or 
implied terms of the fundamental rights provisions, ‘from whatever source they are 
derived’.33 In Re Article 26 and the Information (Termination of Pregnancies) Bill, 
1995,
34
 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that natural law as the fundamental law of 
the state prevailed over the express determination of the people, who are ‘paramount’,35 
                                                 
22 Ibid,, 306. 
23 Ibid. 
24 G. Hogan, ‘The Constitution, Property Right and Proportionality’, Irish Jurist, Vol.32 (1997), 373, 396. 
25 [1974] IR 384. 
26 [1965] IR 294. 
27 Ibid., 312. Article 40(3)(1) states that ‘[t]he State shall guarantees in its laws to respect and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.’ 
28 Ryan, ibid., 313. 
29 G.W. Hogan and G.F. Whyte, J.M. Kelly: The Irish Constitution, 4th ed. (Dublin: Tottel, 2006), 31. 
30 Ibid., 1827. 
31 [1995] 1 IR 321. 
32 Ibid., 333. 
33 Ibid. 
34 [1995] 1 IR 1. 
35 Ibid., 38. 
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in exercising their power to amend the Constitution through a referendum.
36
 However, 
the courts have failed to reach a consensus on the philosophy underpinning the rights 
protections, with North Western Health Board v. H.W.
37
 being a clear demonstration of 
the differing views. There the Supreme Court offered two philosophies underpinning 
Article 41: natural law in common with other philosophies
38
 and the pre-Reformation 
common law tradition.
39
 In this respect, Hogan advocates a focus solely on the ‘inherent 
value of the right’ to be protected rather than on the probable philosophical 
underpinnings.
40
 
The natural law approach is one of five different interpretative approaches 
traditionally identified within the jurisprudence; the others are, namely, the literal, the 
broad, the harmonious, and the historical.
41
 As Hogan and White emphasise, there is no 
consistency within the case law regarding any of the particular approaches, raising worry 
that ‘individual judges are willing to rely on any such approach as will offer adventitious 
support for a conclusion’ already reached.42 These approaches, in particular the natural 
law approach, have been discussed elsewhere.
43
 
 
The right to marry and the institution of marriage in Ireland 
In 1951, the High Court adjudicated on a provision within the code of practice for 
members of An Garda Síochána (Irish Police) requiring police officers to inform the 
Garda Commissioner of their intention to marry. Donovan v. Minister for Justice
44
 is 
noteworthy as it was the first judgment to find that a right to marry was implied in the 
Constitution. Subsequently in Ryan, the High Court discerned that a right to marry 
derived from Article 41 of the Constitution, particularly the reference to ‘the institution of 
marriage’ in Article 41(3)(1), but that such a right was protected also as a personal right 
under Article 40(3)(1). The court reasoned that the terms ‘constitution and authority’ in 
Article 41 determined the scope of the rights of the family as a ‘moral institution’ 
founded upon marriage.
45
 The ruling was then followed by the High Court in Murray v. 
Ireland
46
 and subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court; the High Court in Murray 
supported the finding of Article 41 as a provision protecting the collective rights of the 
family whereas ‘personal rights, which each individual member might enjoy by virtue of 
membership of the family’, must be protected under Article 40(3).47 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 [2001] 3 IR 662.  
38 Ibid., 687. 
39 Ibid., 757. 
40 Hogan, note 14 above, 306. His position was supported by the Supreme Court in North Western Health Board, 
note 37 above. 
41 Hogan and Whyte, note 29 above, 3. 
42 Ibid. 
43 For more recent criticisms, see, e.g., O. Doyle, ‘Legal Validity: Reflections on the Irish Constitution’, Dublin 
University Law Journal, Vol.25 (1993), 56; G.F. Whyte, ‘Natural Law and the Constitution’, Irish Law Times, 
Vol.14 (N.S.) (1996), 8; M. de Blacam, ‘Justice and Natural Law’, Irish Jurist, Vol.32 (1997), 323; S. Mullally, 
‘Searching for Foundations in Irish Constitutional Law’, Irish Jurist, Vol.33 (1998), 333; A. O’Sullivan and 
P.C.W. Chan, ‘Judicial Review in Ireland and the Relationship between the Irish Constitution and Natural Law’, 
Nottingham Law Journal, Vol.15 No.2 (2006), 18. 
44 (1951) 85 ILTR 134. 
45 Ryan, note 26 above, 308. The Supreme Court approved the reasoning of the High Court. 
46 [1985] ILRM 545. 
47 Ibid., 547. 
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The courts have interpreted the nature of marriage in accordance with the 
common law tradition. The oft-cited definition of marriage originated from the English 
matrimonial court’s decision in Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee.,48 where it was 
polygamy that was in issue. The court concluded that ‘marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, may … be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman, to the exclusion of all others’.49 In Ussher v. Ussher,50 the former Irish High 
Court of Justice described the common law and canon law of England and Ireland as 
identical in the pre-Reformation period and ‘all were substantially governed, so far as 
marriage law is concerned, by the Canon law, as decreed and expounded from Rome’51 
but administered by the ecclesiastical court sometimes referred to as the ‘Court 
Christian’..52 
However, pre-1937 statute law and case law must be consistent with the Irish 
Constitution.
53
 According to Pigs Marketing Board v. Donnelly (Dublin)
54
 and 
Educational Company v. Fitzpatrick,
55
 a statute enacted by Parliament of Saorstát 
Éireann (Irish Free State) or of the United Kingdom does not enjoy a presumption of 
constitutionality that attaches to post-1937 Acts of the Oireachtas (Houses of Parliament 
of Ireland). The courts apply a presumption of constitutionality to guarantee judicial 
deference to the Oireachtas and place the burden on the petitioner to prove otherwise. 
The only exception for a pre-1937 law is where the Oireachtas has effectively re-enacted 
the common law or statutory rule.
56
 The common law definition of marriage has been 
applied by Irish courts and re-enacted by the Oireachtas through the Civil Registration 
Act 2004, which lists ‘both parties are of the same sex’ as an impediment to a valid 
marriage.
57
 Express reference to the common law definition of marriage was made in B. 
v. R.,
58
 where the High Court prescribed marriage, as previously and contemporaneously 
conceived, as ‘the voluntary and permanent union of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others for life’.59 In Murray, the High Court described marriage as 
‘derived from a Christian notion of partnership’, ‘a partnership based on an irrevocable 
personal consent given by both spouses which establishes a unique and very special life-
long relationship’.60 Supreme Court Justice McCarthy in N. v. K.61 went further to hold 
that marriage, as a ‘civil contract’, created ‘reciprocating rights and duties between the 
                                                 
48 (1866) LR P & D 130. 
49 Ibid., 133. 
50 [1912] 2 IR 445. 
51 Ibid., 458. 
52 Ibid., 459. 
53 Article 50(1) states that ‘[s]ubject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent 
therewith, the laws in force in Saorstát Éireann immediately prior to the date of the coming into operation of 
this Constitution shall continue to be of full force and effect until the same or any of them shall have been 
repealed or amended by enactment of the Oireachtas.’ 
54 [1939] IR 413. 
55 [1961] IR 345. 
56 ESB v. Gormley [1985] ILRM 494. 
57 Civil Registration Act 2004, No.3/2004, Art.2(2)(e). There was no debate on this paragraph in the Dáil 
(Chamber of Representatives): see Dáil debates, Vol.578, col.276. The only disquiet raised in the Seanad 
(Senate) was from Senator David Norris: see Seanad debates, Vol.175, col.652. 
58 [1995] 1 ILRM 491. 
59 Ibid., 495. 
60 Murray, note 46 above, 536.  
61 [1985] IR 733. 
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parties’ and constituted a ‘status’ relationship affecting the individual parties and the 
community as a whole.
62
 Murray and N. v. K. were subsequently approved by the 
Supreme Court in T.F. v. Ireland.
63
 In T. (D.) v. T. (C.),
64
 Supreme Court Justice Murray 
held marriage to be ‘a solemn contract of partnership entered into between a man and a 
woman with a special status recognised by the Constitution’.65 
In Foy v. An t-Ard Chláraitheoir,
66
 the High Court discussed the issue of capacity. 
The petitioner, who suffered from gender dysphoria, challenged the refusal of the 
Registrar to amend her birth certificate to accord with her male-to-female gender 
reassignment
67
 and sought a declaration of unconstitutionality vis-à-vis the Registration 
of Births and Deaths (Ireland) Act 1863 (as amended) for breaching her rights to equality, 
privacy, and dignity as well as her right to marry under the Constitution.
68
 While the 
court refused relief, it called upon the Oireachtas to urgently review the matter that had 
such impact on many individuals ‘in a most personal and profound way … of deep 
concern to any caring society’.69 It must be noted that the petitioner claimed that the state 
arbitrarily interfered with her right to marry a biological male and was not seeking to be 
or remain married to a biological female. Hence, the petitioner did not challenge the 
common law definition of marriage as opposite-sex-based but the legal concept of gender 
as solely based on biological factors determined at birth. Importantly for the court, she 
was legally married to (albeit separated from) a biological female and had not sought 
divorce or annulment.
70
 Thus, her existing marriage was more immediately relevant to 
her lack of capacity than her birth certificate.
71
 Notwithstanding, the court reaffirmed the 
common law definition of marriage as opposite-sex-based
72
 and held that the right to 
marry was not absolute and must be evaluated in the context of other constitutional rights 
including the ‘rights of society’.73 It is clear that the potential dissolution of the 
petitioner’s marriage weighed heavily in the court’s decision.74 Such ‘unease’, in the light 
of the fact that all of her other legal documents recognised her reassigned gender identity, 
struck a ‘fair, reasonable and just balance’ in the context of competing constitutional 
rights.
75
 Thus, it would appear that the right to marry under Article 40(3) was evaluated 
against the rights of the family under Article 41. As for the ‘rights of society’, the court 
stressed the need to be ‘conscious of society as a whole’,76 which appeared to be invoking 
concepts such as the ‘common good’ that the Preamble prescribes as a goal sought to be 
achieved by the state in order to ensure the dignity of the individual and to attain true 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 754. 
63 [1995] 1 IR 321. 
64 [2002] 3 IR 355. 
65 Ibid., 405. However, the appellate judgment examined the terms of a divorce settlement awarded by the High 
Court and consequently neither the Chief Justice for the majority nor the dissenting judgments made 
declarations on the concept of marriage under Article 41.  
66 [2002] IEHC 116.  
67 Ibid., para.62. 
68 Ibid., para.65. 
69 Ibid., para.177. 
70 Ibid., para.175. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., para.131.  
74 Ibid., para.128. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., para.126. 
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social order. In its judgment, the court referred to the harmonious approach,
77
 whereby a 
provision of the Constitution must be construed in such a way that it would not ‘lead to 
conflict with other Articles and which conforms with the Constitution’s general 
scheme’.78 The courts, thus, must interpret provisions not in isolation but must harmonise 
a particular provision with the Constitution as a whole.
79
 The doctrine has been described 
as ‘no more than a presumption that the people who enacted the Constitution had a single 
scale of values and wished those values to permeate their charter evenly and without 
internal discordance’.80 Thus, in Foy the court must harmoniously interpret the right to 
marry with the context of the fundamental rights provisions as a whole and the avowed 
aspirations of the Constitution. Again, it is clear that the controlling issue was the 
inability of the petitioner’s marriage to remain legally valid if her reassigned gender 
identity were to be legally recognised on her birth certificate given that under the law as it 
stood marriage must be between two persons of opposite sexes. The High Court, then, 
appeared to find that the right to marry must not impinge upon the rights of the family or 
bring about the dissolution of a valid marriage other than by divorce or annulment. 
As Eardly argues, however, by interpreting the Constitution on the basis of the 
common law and statute, the court in Foy effectively sidestepped the inevitable result of 
the petition, that the definition of marriage under the common law and statute was itself 
unconstitutional.
81
 Thus, the Constitution must ‘reflect the common law and statute rather 
than the other way round’.82 As Supreme Court Justice Walsh pointed out in his extra-
judicial writings, the Constitution as the ‘basic law of the State’ ‘controls the Statute and 
Common law’ and, in cases of conflict, prevails.83 
It is also of note that the court’s judgment was delivered immediately before the 
European Court of Human Rights rendered its judgment in Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom,
84
 where the Strasbourg court ruled that gender may be determined by criteria 
other than ones ‘purely biological’,85 thus recognising the gender of post-operative 
transgender persons. After Goodwin, the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003 was enacted, incorporating the Convention into Irish law through an interpretative 
mode of incorporation at sub-constitutional level.
86
 The courts must thenceforth interpret 
and apply any statutory provision or rule of law ‘as far as possible’ in a manner 
compatible with Ireland’s obligations under the Convention87 and, in cases where no 
other legal remedy is adequate, issue a declaration of incompatibility.
88
 In 2007, Foy 
became the first person to be granted a declaration of incompatibility by the High 
                                                 
77 Ibid., para.101.  
78 The State (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Walsh [1981] IR 412, 425.  
79 Hogan and Whyte, note 29 above, 8. See also Dillane v. Ireland [1980] IRLM 167. 
80 Hogan and Whyte, ibid. 
81 J. Eardly, ‘The Constitution and Marriage – The Scope of Protection’, Irish Law Times, Vol.11 (2006), 167, 
168. 
82 Ibid. 
83 B. Walsh, ‘The Constitution: A View from the Bench’, in Farrell, note 12 above, 188, 191. 
84 (2002) 35 EHRR 447. 
85 Ibid., para.99. 
86 A. Lowry, ‘Practice and Procedure under the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003’, Bar Review 
(November 2003), 183, 185. 
87 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, No.20/2003, s.2(1). 
88 Ibid., s.5(1). 
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Court.
89
 There the court strongly reprimanded the state for its failure to legislate for 
gender recognition
90
 given the intervening five-year period since its initial decision and 
Goodwin. The court noted the petitioner’s ongoing divorce proceedings91 but maintained 
that if the petitioner had been divorced, it would hold the reasoning in Goodwin on the 
right to marry under Article 12 to be compelling and applicable in Ireland 
notwithstanding Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution.
92
 Consequently, while it has not 
been definitively stated,
93
 it seems certain that the right to marry in Irish law extends to 
persons who have undergone post-gender reassignment and who seek to marry another 
person of the opposite sex. 
In Zappone and Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners and others, the petitioners 
challenged the Revenue Commissioners’ decision to preclude them from availing of tax 
benefits afforded exclusively married couples under the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.
94
 
The petitioners supported their claim as a married couple with their marriage certificate 
from British Columbia, Canada.
95
 However, the commissioners refused their claim on the 
basis of the phrase ‘husband and wife’ in the taxes legislation as defined by the Oxford 
English dictionary, which referred to an opposite-sex marital relationship.
96
 In their 
application before the High Court, the petitioners argued that by failing to recognise their 
marriage, the state ‘acted without lawful authority, subjected the plaintiffs to unjust and 
invidious discrimination and acted in breach of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs’ 
under Articles 40 and 41. Further and alternatively, the state’s refusal to legally recognise 
their foreign marriage constituted discrimination on grounds of gender and/or sexual 
orientation in breach of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
conjunction with Articles 8 (right to private and family life) and Article 12 (right to 
marry). 
The petitioners argued that the right to marry was a gender-neutral ‘right to marry 
the one you love’ and the state arbitrarily interfered with their right to marry through 
unjustifiable legal restrictions on capacity such as gender or sexual orientation in contrast 
to justifiable restrictions such as degrees of relationship or marriageable age.
97
 The 
petitioners argued that gender and sexual orientation constituted prima facie 
discriminatory grounds
98
 and the burden shifted to the state to justify such restrictions on 
their right to marry each other.
 99
 
                                                 
89 Foy v. An t-Ard Chláraitheoir and others [2007] IEHC 470. In light of Goodwin and the enactment of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, the petitioner sought to raise new issues in her appeal 
before the Supreme Court, which instead re-directed her case to the High Court to re-determine the question 
of compatibility at first instance. 
90 Ibid., paras.100-102. 
91 Ibid., para.104. 
92 Ibid. 
93 It was, however, mentioned in Zappone and Gilligan, note 1 above, 530, as a caveat to the traditional concept 
of marriage. 
94 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, No.39/1997. Pt.15, ch.1. Under sections 1017 and 1019, married persons may 
elect to be jointly assessed for taxation purposes. 
95 Under section 29(1) of the Family Law Act 1995, No.26/1995, a foreign marriage may be recognised in 
Ireland where the applicants are domiciled in Ireland at the date of application or have ordinarily been resident 
in Ireland for a period of one year ending on that date.  
96 Zappone and Gilligan, note 1 above, 407. 
97 Ibid., 444. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., 445. 
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While the petitioners conceded that the framers of the Constitution considered the 
nature of marriage as opposite-sex-based, they nonetheless emphasised that the courts 
had never considered ‘whether marriage could encompass same sex marriage’.100 
Importantly, the description of marriage as a ‘very special life-long relationship’ equally 
applied to marriage between two persons of the same sex.
101
 Furthermore, while the 
common law exclusion of same-sex marriage was based on capacity, there was no 
equivalent provision in the Constitution.
102
 Underpinning their case was that the 
Constitution should be interpreted as a ‘living document’.103 Thus, the definition of 
marriage was not constitutionally fixed or frozen but must be interpreted in accordance 
with ‘prevailing ideas and concepts’. In this respect, they cited a changing consensus on 
marriage with reference to decisions from the United States and Canada.
104
 
In contrast, the state argued that the established methods of interpreting the Constitution 
could not give rise to a right to marry for the petitioners.
105
 Otherwise, the court would 
‘rewrite the plain wording of Article 41’ as well as the recent social policy choice of the 
Oireachtas.
106
 Instead of harmoniously construing Article 41 with the fundamental rights 
provisions as a whole, the provision clearly intended for ‘the family constituting a 
mother, father and children of a heterosexual marriage’.107 For the court to rule otherwise 
would amount to an amendment to the Constitution without requisite referendum.
108
 
Furthermore, the state contended that no jurisprudential basis had been presented that 
would allow for such radical alteration of the nature of marriage. The ‘living document’ 
approach, advocated by the petitioners, did not allow ‘the courts to depart from what the 
Constitution says or implies or was understood in 1937’.109 While the courts may 
interpret the Constitution in light of prevailing ideas, it did not mean that ‘the words of 
the Constitution can be divorced from their historical context’.110 Although the High 
Court considered that the Constitution should be interpreted as a ‘living document’, it 
agreed with the state that there was a difference between discovering unenumerated rights 
in McGee and re-defining a right ‘clearly understood … to mean something which it has 
never done to date’. 111 Based on its analysis of Supreme Court Justice Murray’s 
methodology in Sinnott,
112
 the court ultimately found that marriage, as 
contemporaneously understood, was opposite-sex-based and refused relief. 
The ‘living document’ approach to constitutional interpretation is one yet to be 
entrenched within the jurisprudence. It may be traced to Supreme Court Justice Walsh’s 
dictum in McGee where he proposed the virtues of prudence, justice and charity as 
jurisprudential guides to ‘discovering’ the existence of unenumerated rights, holding that 
‘[i]t is but natural that from time to time the prevailing ideas of these virtues may be 
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conditioned by the passage of time; no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be 
final for all time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts’.113 It ought to be 
noted that Justice Walsh himself interpreted the Constitution in McGee on the basis of the 
natural law approach,
114
 reiterating that Articles 40-44 subordinated law to justice,
115
 the 
highest virtue in ancient Greek and early Christian philosophy, reinforced by prudence 
and charity, two other virtues that were also highly esteemed in ancient Greece and 
Christianity.
116
 These three virtues were expressly stated in the Preamble to the 
Constitution as part of the central aim ‘to promote the common good … so that the 
dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured [and] true social order attained’.117 
Thus, judges must ‘as best they can from their training and their experience interpret 
these rights in accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice and charity’.118 
However, can his analysis have a broader application than as a jurisprudential tool 
for discovering unenumerated rights? Support may be derived from Justice Walsh’s use 
of the semi-colon. Hart’s Rules state that a semi-colon ‘separates two or more clauses 
which are of more or less equal importance and are linked as a pair or series’.119 Thus, the 
conditioning of prevailing ideas of prudence, justice and charity by the passage of time 
and the lack of a fixed interpretation of the Constitution are independent clauses. They 
have a close relation to one another and possess equal importance. My argument is 
further supported by the final sentence in the passage. ‘It’ refers to the interpretation of 
the Constitution, which must be interpreted in accordance with ‘prevailing ideas and 
concepts’. In addition, as Justice Walsh has stated extra-judicially, the courts should view 
the Constitution as a ‘contemporary fundamental law that speaks in the present tense’.120 
Thus, ‘as a document, [the Constitution] speaks from 1937, but as law it speaks from 
today’,121 and it should not be interpreted as ‘having a static meaning determined 50 
years ago but on the basis that it lays down broad governing principles that can cope with 
current problems’.122 It is argued that Justice Walsh advocated contemporaneous 
interpretation of the Constitution on the basis of ‘prevailing’ ideas of prudence, justice 
and charity. However, the ‘prevailing ideas and concepts’ are to be determined by 
individual judges who may or may not be influenced by their own subjective ideas and 
concepts when interpreting the Constitution. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in State 
(Healy) v. O’Donoghue123 invoked Justice Walsh’s dictum and argued that the ‘rights 
given by the Constitution’ must be ‘considered’ or determined in accordance with 
prudence, justice and charity, concepts which may gradually change and develop 
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according to prevailing ideas and concepts.
124
 The court held that such an approach to 
constitutional interpretation inhered in the Preamble to the Constitution.
125
 
More recently in Sinnott, Supreme Court Justices Murray, Geoghegan, and 
Denham agreed with the thesis that the Constitution should be regarded as a living 
document and interpreted in accordance with ‘contemporary circumstances’ including 
prevailing ideas and mores.
126
 Justice Murray, however, qualified that an interpretation 
‘in accordance with contemporary circumstances’ cannot be ‘divorced from its historical 
context’;127 ‘by definition that which is contemporary is determined by reference to its 
historical context’.128 He endorsed Kelly’s guidance for balancing competing claims 
between the historical and the ‘present tense’ approaches.129 Kelly contended that the 
‘present tense’ approach was appropriate to standards and values; personal rights, the 
common good, social justice, and equality ‘can (indeed can only be) interpreted 
according to the lights of today as Judges perceive and share them’.130 Yet the historical 
approach was appropriate ‘where some law-based system is in issue, like jury trial, 
county councils, the census’.131 This, however, did not mean that ‘the shape of such 
systems is in every respect fixed in the permafrost of 1937. The courts ought to have 
some leeway for considering which dimensions of the system are secondary, and which 
are so material to traditional constitutional values that a willingness to see them diluted or 
substantially abolished without a referendum could not be imputed to the enacting 
electorate’.132 
In Sinnott, the petitioner was a 22-year-old person with profound general learning 
disability and autism, who succeeded in his claim before the High Court that the state was 
under a duty to provide free primary education beyond the age of eighteen and for so long 
as his educational needs required.
133
 The Supreme Court by majority allowed a limited 
appeal by the state and ruled that the duty of the state was owed children not adults and 
the petitioner was entitled to free primary education up to the age of 18 as appropriate to 
his needs as an autistic child.
134
 There Justice Murray held that historically the meaning 
of primary education was always understood as basic education to children in the primary 
school cycle. While the ages where the primary cycle was to begin and to end may be ‘a 
variant of history, culture and policy in any given country’, it was understood to be the 
primary school cycle in which children and not adults were taught.
135
 However, the judge 
held that the ‘nature and concept’ of primary education may be determined in light of 
present-day circumstances with the concept of primary education being an ‘abstract 
concept with connotations of standards and values’.136 Historically as at the time of the 
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promulgation of the Constitution, persons with intellectual disability were not able to 
benefit from primary education as traditionally available for it would not have been 
considered to encompass the provision of basic education and training skills, such as 
toilet training and basic mobility, but rather the primary school cycle and curriculum.
137
 
Justice Murray maintained that ‘with greater insight into the nature of people’s 
handicaps, the evolution of teaching methods, new curricula as well as new tools of 
education, there is no doubt that the nature and content of primary education must be 
defined in contemporary circumstances’,138 and that where children ‘are capable of 
benefiting from primary education (however its content is defined), the State is under an 
obligation to ensure that it is provided free to children’.139 As for the duration of 
childhood, Justice Murray considered it a secondary matter and reasoned that limitations 
were for the government and the Oireachtas to determine although they were subject to 
judicial review by the courts in cases where their determination may have failed their 
constitutional obligations.
140
 Justice Murray’s emphasis on ‘contemporary circumstances’ 
modified Justice Walsh’s dictum that the judge ought to interpret the Constitution in 
accordance with his or her prevailing ideas of prudence, justice and charity, and arguably 
lessened the room for judicial subjectivity by focusing on contemporary knowledge in 
medical, scientific and sociological research rather than on abstract philosophical 
concepts. Justice Murray then supported his reasoning through the harmonious approach, 
interpreting the duty of the state in the context of Article 42 as a whole and concluding 
that the provision was ‘child-centred’.141 The reference in Article 42(1) to the ‘Family’ as 
the natural educator of the ‘child’ set the tone and subsequent paragraphs in Article 42 
outlined the parameters for state interference with the rights and duties of parents in its 
role as ‘guardian of the common good.142 
In Zappone and Gilligan, then, the High Court held that on the basis of Sinnott the 
concept of marriage as at 1937 ought to be established with capacity determined in 
accordance with the prevailing law.
143
 Thus, the court acknowledged that the framers of 
the Constitution could not have contemplated a same-sex union within the concept of 
marriage in 1937 but the prevailing law, including the High Court decision in Foy and the 
Supreme Court decision in T. v. T.,
144
 clearly did not support a concept of marriage as 
‘fossilised’.145 The court also referred to the recent reform of marriage law through the 
Civil Registration Act 2004, which enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and must 
constitute a clear indication of the prevailing ‘ideas and concepts’ of marriage.146 
This, however, begs the question as to whether in dealing with capacity to 
exercise a right constituting a traditional constitutional value, recently enacted legislation 
or regulation may suffice. Clearly, deference should be had to the Oireachtas which is 
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under a constitutional duty to legislate in accordance with the Constitution, and such 
deference by the courts is mandated by the presumption of constitutionality that must be 
rebutted by a petitioner. In Zappone and Gilligan, success for the petitioners would have 
rendered the Civil Registration Act 2004 unconstitutional despite the fact that they did 
not directly challenge the particular statute; the subject of their challenge was the Taxes 
Consolidation Act 1997, which applied the same interpretation of marriage as the Civil 
Registration Act. 
Furthermore, while legislation may indicate the contemporary majority view, the 
majority view itself, in the words of South African Constitutional Court Justice Albie 
Sachs, ‘can often be harsh to minorities that exist outside the mainstream’.147 Thus, the 
function of the Constitution is ‘to step in and counteract rather than reinforce unfair 
discrimination against a minority’.148 Vindicating rights under the Constitution protects 
groups who have been discriminated against by the ordinary law and, who cannot ‘count 
on popular support and strong representation in the legislature’. 149 The judge considered 
that the test under the South African Constitution was whether the measure ‘promotes or 
retards the achievement of human dignity, equality and freedom’.150 In a somewhat 
similar vein, the Irish Constitution embodies and enshrines the objective that measures by 
the state ensure the dignity of the individual so that true social order may be attained.
151
 
As the High Court held in Murray, when dealing with limitations imposed by the state, it 
is not to balance the right of the state and the right of the individual but the power of the 
state and whether the exercise of its power is constitutionally permissible. Thus, the 
Constitution imposes ‘very clear and specific correlative duties’ upon the state to protect 
and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen but it also designates the state as the 
guardian of the common good which as such is empowered to restrict a personal right in 
certain circumstances.
152
 In Zappone and Gilligan, the High Court did not examine 
whether the relevant case law and statute undermined a personal right. In other words, 
can an indefinite bar to exercising the right to marry, rather than an age-related limitation, 
constitute a legitimate exercise of state power? 
It is important to note that the approach to contemporaneous constitutional 
interpretation taken by the High Court in Zappone and Gilligan differed from that by 
Supreme Court Justice Murray’s methodology in Sinnott, where capacity to partake in a 
law-based system (state primary education) was first discerned against historical and 
contemporary circumstances to derive a traditional constitutional value (right to 
education) and then assessed through a harmonious textual analysis of Article 42. To 
adopt the approach in relation to the question of marriage, it is clear that marriage as an 
institution is a law-based system derived from what is a core ‘traditional constitutional 
value’, namely, the right to marry. Therefore, the nature and content of marriage as a law-
based system must be examined from a historical context and yet interpreted in 
accordance with ‘contemporary circumstances’; thus, the institution of marriage must be 
interpreted in accordance with contemporary standards and values, including greater 
insights into sexuality and sexual orientation, relevant advances in technologies, and, 
                                                 
147 Minister of Home Affairs and another v. Fourie and another, 2006 (3) BCLR 355, para.94. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., para.74. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937, Preamble. 
152 Murray, note 46 above, 549. 
Working Paper: Pre-Edited Paper for publication in (2009) 13(2/3) International Journal of Human Rights  
 
above all, contemporary standards of equality and non-discrimination. Then, a 
harmonious textual analysis of Articles 40(3) and 41 must support such an examination 
with regard to capacity to marry. 
While the institution of marriage in Ireland was conceived in accordance with the 
common law tradition as exclusive to opposite-sex couples and has been repeatedly and 
consistently upheld by the courts and recently re-enacted by the Oireachtas, it is 
noteworthy that certain jurisdictions where this common-law definition was applicable 
have now moved forward in order to recognise the equal worth and dignity of sexual 
minorities in all aspects of their lives. As the Canadian Supreme Court pointed out in its 
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage:
153
 
 
The reference to ‘Christendom’ is telling. Hyde spoke to a society of 
shared social values where marriage and religion were thought to be 
inseparable. This is no longer the case. Canada is a pluralistic society. 
Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil institution. The 
‘frozen concepts’ reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental 
principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution 
is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates 
and addresses the realities of modern life.
154
 
 
Recognition of pluralism and maintenance of religious neutrality have always been noted 
in Irish jurisprudence.
155
 Thus, while bearing in mind the historical origins and context of 
marriage, the Irish Constitution ought to be interpreted in the light of ‘contemporary 
circumstances’, including the recognition that sexuality is ‘a feature of the human 
condition’.156 In Ireland, sexual orientation already constitutes a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in employment
157
 and access to goods and services.
158
 
Under the Constitution, all citizens are equal before the law.
159
 In In re Article 26 
and the Employment Equality Bill 1996,
160
 the Supreme Court held that while 
presumptive forms of discrimination under the Constitution were not particularised, 
discrimination on grounds of ‘sex, race, language, religious or political opinion’ was 
clearly prohibited.
161
 Where a piece of legislation discriminates in favour of a certain 
class of persons, it need not be justified if justification can be found within the 
Constitution.
162
 However, such legislation objectively must not be arbitrary, unreasonable 
or unjust and as such incapable of justifying the discrimination.
163
 In In re Article 26 and 
the Employment Equality Bill 1996, the Supreme Court approved the approach of the 
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High Court in Brennan v. Attorney General
164
 that a classification must be ‘for a 
legitimate legislative purpose… It must be relevant to that purpose, and … each class 
must be treated fairly’.165 
Thus, the exclusion of a same-sex couple from their capacity to marry each other 
is based solely on grounds of sexual orientation and Irish marriage law favours persons 
who are sexually inclined towards others of the opposite sex. Is there a different physical 
or moral capacity or social function between same-sex and opposite-sex relationships? 
The state in Zappone and Gilligan argued that Article 41 expressly contemplated a 
distinction between the committed relationship of the petitioners and a marriage between 
two persons of opposite sexes.
166
 The argument, however, circularly circumvented the 
central issue: the agreed component of marriage – a ‘unique and special life-long 
relationship’ to the exclusion of all others – is clearly applicable to both a committed 
opposite-sex relationship and a committed same-sex relationship equally. The committed 
life-long unions that result from both kinds of relationships serve an equal, and equally 
important, social function within the community: that of life-long partnership in love and 
support within a broader family unit. 
Some words should be laid on the welfare of children reared by same-sex couples, 
which was a key issue for the High Court where there was disagreement among 
psychologists as to the adequacies, methodologies and conclusions of relevant empirical 
studies. In the absence of scientific consensus within the evidence, the court took a 
cautious stance calling for longitudinal studies before definite findings could be made. 
However, the absence of scientific consensus over the welfare of children cannot 
normatively deny a same-sex couple from marrying each other if doing so is their right. 
Furthermore, as de Londras has pointed out, a gay man or a lesbian may already apply as 
an unmarried individual to adopt a child and is subject to a rigorous assessment process 
as to his or her suitability as a parent, in the same manner as an unmarried heterosexual is 
to apply and with the best interests and welfare of the child being a paramount 
consideration.
167
 
As stated above, the right to marry is implied in the reference to marriage in 
Article 41, but it is also protected as an unenumerated personal right under Article 40(3), 
which imposes upon the state the duty to guarantee in its laws and vindicate by its laws 
‘as far as practicable’ the personal rights of the citizen. As a personal right, it is not 
absolute and its exercise may be restricted by the state within constitutionally permissible 
limits, namely, protection of other constitutional rights and maintenance of the ‘common 
good’. There is, however, no textual exclusion in the Constitution precluding a same-sex 
couple from exercising a personal right to marry each other. 
Furthermore, under Article 41, the family is a unit group founded upon marriage 
with its nature and content undefined. A duty, however, is imposed upon the state to 
guard with special care the institution of marriage. In its analysis in Zappone and 
Gilligan using the harmonious approach, the High Court found that Article 41 as a whole 
clearly excluded a same-sex union and the duty on the state to guard marriage and protect 
it from attack justified the exclusion based on the historical and prevailing definition of 
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marriage and the lack of conclusive longitudinal studies as to the long-term psychological 
and psychosexual developmental effect on the welfare of children reared by same-sex 
parents.
168
 
However, I argue that the only potential exclusionary textual references (similar 
to the word ‘child’ in Article 42) are references to a ‘woman’s life within the home’ and 
‘mothers’ in Article 41(2), which connote a ‘nuclear’ family. Given that contemporarily 
there are different kinds of committed relationships, textually a lesbian couple could 
come within such references. Article 41(2) is a highly controversial provision, which 
within the lifetime of the Constitution hitherto has largely been dormant in the 
jurisprudence and appears to be little more than a convenient tool for judges in times of 
need. The provision has been heavily criticised for its evident gender stereotyping and the 
Constitutional Review Group has recommended that it be amended to embrace a gender-
neutral recognition of carers in the home,
169
 which unfortunately has been rejected by the 
All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution.
170
 To justify the exclusion of all 
committed same-sex relationships from access to the institution of marriage requires a 
stronger basis than a textual difficulty. This textual difficulty contrasts with the 
significance of the terms ‘child’ and ‘parents’ in Article 42 as dissected in Sinnott. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the High Court in Zappone and Gilligan misapplied the 
approach of Supreme Court Justice Murray in Sinnott when interpreting the Constitution 
contemporaneously. While Sinnott offers hopes for an individual to vindicate his or her 
right under the Constitution to marry another person regardless of gender or sexual 
orientation, it is likely that the Supreme Court in the appellate Zappone and Gilligan 
proceedings currently pending will uphold the High Court judgment out of deference to 
the Oireachtas given its recent re-enactment of the common law definition of marriage 
through the Civil Registration Act 2004.
171
 Full recognition of the equal worth and 
dignity of sexual minorities in Ireland, thus, lies in the hands of the Oireachtas.
172
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